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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
TORTS: THE RESCUE DOCTRINE
AND BREACH OF WARRANTY
In Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Company,' the New
York Court of Appeals held a manufacturer liable, in an action
for breach of implied warranty, for deaths and injuries to
non-users, basing the decision on a unique application of the
rescue doctrine.
On October 2, 1957, Rooney and Fattore, two employees of
the Bureau of Sewage Disposal for the City of New York, de-
scended into a sewer to determine the source of water in a
bulkhead. Both were wearing oxygen producing masks. Roon-
ey's mask had been manufactured by the defendant, Mine
Safety Appliance Company. On the way out of the sewer Roon-
ey collapsed and died of asphyxiation. Fattore removed his
mask to call for help, and six members of Rooney's sewer re-
pair team responded to the calls, descending into the sewer
without protective masks. Two of them died, and the other four
and Fattore were injured by the lethal gas in the tunnel.
The five surviving rescuers and the administrators of the
estates of the two who were killed sued Mine Safety for breach
of implied warranty of merchantability. The plaintiffs based
their argument on the "danger invites rescue" theory, claim-
ing that it was the defendant's wrongful act in manufacturing
a defective mask which created the danger to which the
plaintiffs responded.
The plaintiffs recovered substantial awards2 in the trial
court, and Mine Safety appealed to the New York Supreme
Court, Appellate Division, which affirmed the decision subject
1 25 N.Y.2d 460, 255 N.E.2d 173, 306 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1969).
2 The amounts awarded were as follows: For the two deaths,
$225,000 for Guarino's death and $20,000 for Messina's death,
plus $15,000 for the pain and suffering of each. For the
injuries, $7,500 to Fattore, and $1,500 to each of the other
four plaintiffs.
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to a remittitur.3 The appellate division sidestepped the de-
fendant's attack on the judment as an "unwarranted and
unjustified extension of breach of warranty liability," point-
ing out that the earlier case of Rooney v. S. A. Healy Com-
pany4 had determined that the defendant had committed a
breach of warranty as to Rooney, and that the present plain-
iffs derived their right to recover through Rooney. Thus,
according to the appellate division, the plaintiffs were not
recovering directly for breach of warranty. Rather, the ac-
tions were founded essentially on the rescue doctrine.
On appeal the New York Court of Appeals in the present
case affirmed without dissent, but with a concurring opinion
which opposed such an unqualified extension of the applica-
tion of the rescue doctrine to breach of implied warranty.5
The doctrine that "danger invites rescue" is a common
law theory originally created to avoid a p1 a i n t if f being
found contributorily negligent when he voluntarily places
himself in a dangerous situation to prevent another person
from suffering serious injury or death.6 The doctrine is
3 Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 31 App. Div. 2d
255, 297 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1969). The remittitur reduced the
$225,000 award for Guarino's death to $185,000.
4 20 N.Y.2d 42, 228 N.E.2d 383, 281 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1967). This
companion case was a wrongful death action in which
Rooney's administratrix recovered against the vendor of
the defective gas mask. Whether or not this case resolved
for the present case the issue of the defective nature of
the mask was an important question considered at length
by the appellate division. The court determined that res
judicata would apply, making it unnecessary to relitigate
the issue.
5 25 N.Y.2d at 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
6 Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 244 N.E.2d 26, 295 N.Y.S.
2d 322 (1968); see Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir.
1942); Bock v. Peabody Co-op. Equity Exch., 186 Kan. 657,
352 P.2d 37 (1960); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502,
3 Am. R. 721 (1871); Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171
1970]
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recognized in virtually every jurisdiction in the United States.7
It is normally applied to allow recovery by a rescuer against
the third party whose negligence was responsible for the
danger to the one rescued.8 However, it has also been applied
in actions against the rescued person where his own negli-
gence had created his perilous position.0
The general rules surrounding the rescue doctrine, as
expounded by the leading cases in the field, involve rather
expansive views of, if not exceptions to, two elementary tort
principles- contributory negligence, and duty or foresee-
ability.
As was stated previously, the rescue doctrine was de-
veloped in order to get around the defense of contributory
negligence. The doctrine does not eliminate contributory neg-
ligence as a defense but rather applies a different standard
by which to measure that negligence. The determining ques-
tion is not whether the rescuer exposed himself to risk, but
whether it was exposure to an unreasonable risk.10 And
unless the rescue attempt was rashly or recklessly made,
Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631 (1932). See generally 1 T. SHF~mAN
& A. REDnmD, A TREATISE O N THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE §
102 (rev. ed. 1941).
7 See Annot., 158 A.L.R. 189 (1945); Annot., 19 A.L.R. 4 (1922).
8 See Carter v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Okla.
1965); Elliott v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 203 Kan.
273, 454 P.2d 124 (1969); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Ken-
nard, 199 Okla. 1, 181 P.2d 234 (1946); Wagner v. Interna-
tional Ry., 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
9 Ruth v. Ruth, 213 Tenn. 82, 372 S.W.2d 285 (1963); Talbert
v. Talbert, 22 Misc. 2d 782, 199 N.Y.S.2d 212 (Sup. Ct. 1960) ;
Carney v. Buyea, 271 App. Div. 338, 65 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1946);
Brugh v. Bigelow, 310 Mich. 74, 16 N.W.2d 668 (1944). But
see Saylor v. Parsons, 122 Iowa 679, 98 N.W. 500 (1904).
10 For a discussion of the degree of negligence necessary to
constitute contributory negligence in rescue cases see Com-
ment, Recovery by the Rescuer, 28 LA. L. REv. 609, 612-14
(1968).
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the rescuer's action will not be held to be contributory neg-
ligence." The test is whether the ever-present "prudent man"
would judge the behavior to be rash and reckless, consider-
ing all the surrounding circumstances. 12 The rescuer is al-
lowed to act on appearances only, as long as there is a
reasonable basis for believing the rescued person is in im-
minent danger.13
Since an action founded on the rescue doctrine has always
been basically a negligence case, there must be a breach of
duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant and an injury
proximately caused by that breach.14 The courts have little
trouble with the issue of proximate cause. It is apparently
well settled that the chain of causation, when the defendant
is negligent, is not broken by an act of rescue.'3 This is true
even where the rescuer's behavior is not spontaneous, but
is planned and deliberate. 16 The element of duty is a more
difficult question. Justice Cardozo dealt with this problem
11 Henneman v. McCalla, 260 Iowa 60, 148 N.W.2d 447 (1967);
Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70 N.W.2d 805 (1955); Pitts-
burg, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Lynch, 69 Ohio St. 123, 68 N.E.
703 (1903); Pennsylvania Co. v. Langendorff, 48 Ohio St.
316, 28 N.E. 172 (1891).
12 See Aylor v. Intercounty Constr. Corp., 381 F.2d 930 (D.C.
Cir. 1967); Henneman v. McCalla, 260 Iowa 60, 148 N.W.2d
447 (1967); Wolfinger v. Shaw, 138 Neb. 229, 292 N.W. 731
(1940); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502, 3 Am. R.
721 (1871).
18 Highland v. Wilsonian Inv. Co., 171 Wash. 34, 17 P.2d 631
(1932); see Wolff v. Light, 169 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1969).
14 Provenzo v. Sam, 23 N.Y.2d 256, 244 N.E.2d 26, 296 N.Y.S.2d
322 (1968).
15 Rovinski v. Rowe, 131 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1942); Carter v.
United States, 248 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Okla. 1965); Maryland
Steel Co. v. Marney, 88 Md. 482, 42 A. 60 (1898); Duff v.
Bemidji Motor Serv. Co., 210 Minn. 456, 299 N.W. 196 (1941);
Gibney v. State, 137 N.Y. 1, 33 N.E. 142 (1893).
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in Wagner v. International Railway Company1 7 which in-
volved an attempted rescue of a passenger who had been
thrown from a crowded railway car. Justice Cardozo said,
in effect, that although the particular rescuer may not have
been foreseen by the wrongdoer, rescuers as a class are always
foreseeable as a possible consequence of a negligent act which
places someone in danger. And the foreseeability of the rescue
attempt brings the rescuer within the scope of the wrongdoer's
duty. It was this concept that inspired Jusice Cardozo's fam-
ous words that "danger invites rescue." Prior to the holding
in Wagner, the rescue cases were considered an exception to
the limitation of duty to the "foreseeable risk."18
As can be seen from the foregoing discussion, underly-
ing the entire theory of the rescue doctrine is the require-
ment that the need for rescue must grow out of an act of
negligence. Yet, in Guarino, the court has rejected this tradi-
tional notion that the rescue doctrine is applicable only to
cases founded on a theory of negligence. The court reviewed
the development of the "danger invites rescue" doctrine and
noted that all the cases that have invoked the doctrine since
it was first promulgated by the courts have been negligence
actions. The court proposed, however, that the theory of the
action is insignificant in the application of the rescue doc-
trine, reasoning that the important feature is a wrong com-
mitted, and that a "breach of warranty and an act of negli-
gence are each clearly wrongful acts." Three cases are cited
in support of this conclusion. Two of the cases, although
based on a negligence theory, called the initiating wrong a
"culpable act" or a "wrong" rather than a "negligent act."
The third case labeled breach of warranty as a "tortious
wrong." In Provenzo v. Sam,'9 the first case relied upon, it
was held that the rescue doctrine should be applied when
17 Id.
18 See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF Tnm LAW OF TORTS 316-17
(3rd ed., Hornbook Series 1964).
19 23 N.Y.2d 256, 244 N.E.2d 26, 296 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1968).
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one party by his "culpable act" has placed another person in
a position of peril which invites the rescuing plaintiff to come
to his aid. The court then quoted Goldberg v. Kollsman In-
strument Corporation" which held that a breach of warranty
was "a tortious wrong." The court seems to have applied
basic logic that a "culpable act" is sufficient to call forth
the rescue doctrine, a breach of warranty is a culpable act,
and therefore a breach of warranty is sufficient to invoke
the rescue doctrine. The court further buttressed its argu-
ment with the noted Cardozo opinion in Wagner v. Interna-
tional Railway Company2' which stated that the "wrong
that imperils life . . . is a wrong also to his rescuer."
In the concurring opinion Judge Scileppi, joined by Judge
Burke, maintained that the result should be limited to factual
situations similar to the present case, where there is a great
moral obligation. In Guarino, Judge Scileppi felt that a moral
obligation arose out of the unusual factual setting in which
the rescuers were all a part of a team engaged in a common
effort, and that application of the rescue doctrine to breach
of warranty cases should not be extended beyond this. Judge
Scileppi based his opposition on his feeling that (1) such
an application of the rescue doctrine is too susceptible to
abuse, and (2) the elimination of distinctions between breach
of warranty and negligence liability "has already gone too
far."22
The concurring opinion touched upon an aspect of the
case which was not decided, but w hi c h is deserving of
some attention in light of the burgeoning field of products
liability. Basically, Guarino adds another class to the grow-
ing list of those to whom a manufacturer is liable when
he makes and distributes a defective product. Although the
court of appeals in Guarino quotes with approval the appel-
20 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963).
21 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E. 437 (1921).
22 25 N.Y.2d at 466, 255 N.E.2d at 176, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 946.
19701
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late division's holding that in this case "the rescuer's status
as a user or non-user of the defective instrumentality is not
directly revelant" since the judgments were premised funda-
mentally on the rescue doctrine,23 the fact remains that
Guarino did allow recovery by non-users who were not even
directly injured by the manufacturer's product.
The requirement of privity of contract in breach of war-
ranty actions has undergone considerable attack and revision
in recent years until very little remains of the rule.24 The
entire area is now covered by the Uniform Commercial Code.25
The class of possible warranty beneficiaries is specifically
set out in Section 2-318 which seems to limit liability to the
buyer's household and guests in his home who may be rea-
sonably expected to use the goods.26 And, although Com-
ment 3 indicates the class of beneficiaries was not intended
to be limited to those expressly named in Section 2-318,2T
several states have effected changes in the section or have
2 25 N.Y.2d at 465, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
24 See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961). See generally S. SPEISER,
RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 2:11 (1966).
25 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-314 to -318.
26 U IFORMn CO'mERcIAL CODE § 2-318 (1962 Official Text)
provides:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied ex-
tends to any natural person who is in the family or
household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home
if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use,
consume or be affected by the goods and who is in-
jured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller
may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
27 UNIFORM COM1MlERCAL CODE § 2-318, Comment 3 (1962
Official Text) provides:
This section expres~ly includes as beneficiaries within
its provisions the family, household, and guests of the
purchaser. Beyond this, the section is neutral and is
not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case
law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his
buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the dis-
tributive chain.
[Vol. 6, No. 3
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substituted anti-privity statutes, 28 fearing that the section may
be contrary to their existing policy of allowing recovery with-
out privity. Even the more liberal jurisdictions, however,
have not yet extended the manufacturer's liability to include
one who not only was a non-user, but was not directly in-
jured by the product.
We may conclude then that the apparent effect of Guarino
is to make a new remedy available to certain qualified plain-
tiffs bringing actions for wrongful death or personal injuries,
which in the process, adds a new warranty beneficiary to
whom a manufacturer may be liable. In order to take ad-
vantage of this new remedy against a manufacturer, only two
broad prerequisites must be satisfied. First, the plaintiff must
have been injured in any of various reasonable acts of rescue,
and second, the one being rescued must have been endangered
by defective goods which were manufactured by the de-
fendant. It should be noted that the rescue doctrine does
not require that the endangered party be injured.29 In fact,
many times he escapes unharmed and only the rescuer suffers
injury or death.
There is increasing litigation in the field of products lia-
bility, and breach of warranty actions are far from rare.
The Guarino decision takes on added impact when you con-
sider that in every situation which involves an injury alleged-
ly caused by a defective instrumentality, there is a possibility
of a deliverer arriving on the scene. Especially is this true
considering the broad scope of the rescue doctrine which has
held that even going for medical aid is an act of rescue0
28 California, Utah, Virginia, Arkansas, Connecticut, Colorado;
Alabama, South Dakota, Wyoming and Texas have all
changed § 2-318 in some form, permitting the courts to
broaden the scope of warranty protection. Comment, UCC
.... Section 2-318: Effect on Washington Requirements of Priv-
ity in Products Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. R v. 253 (1966).
29 See Elliott v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 203 Kan. 273,
454 P.2d 124 (1969); Hatch v. Globe Laundry Co., 132 Me.
1970]
8
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 6 [1969], Iss. 3, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol6/iss3/9
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
Existing Oklahoma law indicates that the result reached
in Guarino could very well have been reached in an Okla-
homa court. Oklahoma is in accord with the majority of
jurisdictions in accepting the theory of the rescue doctrine.
Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court early held that the
application of the doctrine was "inhibited" by the constitu-
tional provision that contributory negligence is a jury ques-
tion,31 a later case indicated that, with the proper jury in-
structions, the rescue doctrine may be applied. 2 This view
was more recently affirmed in Carter v. United States,8
a federal district court case arising out of the Eastern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma, which allowed recovery based on the
rescue doctrine. Oklahoma also has evidenced, both before
and after adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, a liberal
view of the necessity of privity in breach of warranty ac-
tions.34 There appears to be no reason why the Guarino de-
dision could not be followed in Oklahoma.
It is submitted that breach of warranty is a fertile field
for a logical extension of the rescue doctrine. It may be true
that the expansion of the doctrine is open to abuse, as Judge
Scileppi pointed out. However, it is difficult to see how the
rescue doctrine would be more widely susceptible to abuse
in breach of warranty actions than it is in negligence cases.
379, 171 A. 387 (1934); Parks v. Starks, 342 Mich. 443, 70
N.W.2d 805 (1955); Eckert v. Long Island R.R., 43 N.Y. 502,
3 Am. R. 721 (1871).
30 Carter v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Okla. 1965).
31 Oklahoma Power & Water Co. v. Jamison, 188 Okla. 118, 106
P.2d 1097 (1940).
32 Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Kennard, 199 Okla. 1, 181 P.2d
234 (1946).
3 248 F. Supp. 105 (E.D. Okla. 1965).
34 See Speed Fastners, Inc. v. Newsom, 382 F.2d 395 (10th
Cir. 1967); Barnhart v. Freeman Equip. Co., 441 P.2d 993
(Okla. 1968); Marathon Battery Co. v. Kilpatrick, 418 P.2d
900 (Okla. 1965); Crane Co. v. Sears, 168 Okla. 603, 35 P.2d
916 (1934).
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In an ordinary rescue situation, the rescuer who subjects
himself to danger and is thereby injured would be remediless
without aid of the rescue doctrine. A rescuer should not be
rendered once again without remedy because the need for
rescue arose from a breach of warranty rather than from
negligence. This concept is most aptly expressed by the court
in the Guarino opinion:
To require that a rescuer answering the cry for help
make inquiry as to the nature of the culpable act that
imperils someone's life would defy all logic.8 5
Both the law and the facts seem to support the decision reached
in Guarino v. Mine Safety Appliance Company.
Pat S. Barnes
3r 25 N.Y.2d at 464, 255 N.E.2d at 175, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 945.
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